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SENATE BILL NO. II* AND ANTITRUST POLICY
KENNETH S. CARLSTON**
When an individual considers and selects the goals which he desires
to reach, experiments with and carries out action designed to reach
such goals, and evaluates the effectiveness of his past action with a
view toward shaping his future conduct, we have organized action.
The individual here learns that no one goal can override all others and
that action must reflect a composite of goals and values.
As we move from the organized life of the individual to the organi-
zational life of society, we learn that the process of ordering action is
quite different from that of evaluating action. We learn that the
legislative process of determining social goals, and allocating the
resources of society to reach those goals, is quite different from the
evaluative or judicial process. The latter makes one aspect of a com-
plex factual situation the turning point for its decision and for its
pronouncement of a rule for action. The former is concerned with
harmonizing a number of conflicting social demands, determining
priorities among them, and achieving proportion, balance and harmony
in the resultant group action.
The history of the judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act' is
a history of the legislative process working through the mechanisms
of the judicial process. Starting with an act phrased in the most
general of terms,2 nearly seventy years of judicial administration have
developed a system of interdependent postulates analogous to legis-
lative norms.3 None of these postulates can be considered as prevailing
over all others. But the binding thread of the Sherman Act is the
proposition that the market shall be dynamic, manifesting sufficient
energy through price competition by the organizations participating
in the market to ensure that the advances of technology will be con-
stantly passed on to buyers.
A desirable postulate, which can be only partially realized through
* 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
** Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
1. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952).
2. "As a charter of freedom, the Act has a generality and adaptability
comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions. It does
not go into detailed definitions which might either work injury to legitimate
enterprise or through particularization defeat its purposes by providing loop-
holes for escape." Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344,
359-60 (1933).
3. For a list of such postulates, see CARLSTON, LAW AmW STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL
ACTI ON 214 (1956). For a more extended analysis of the Sherman Act, particu-
larly with regard to the legislative and judicial processes at work therein,
see id. c. 7, as well as Carlston, Antitrust Policy: A Problem in Statecraft,
60 YALE L.J. 1073 (1951) and Carlston, Role of the Antitrust Laws in the
Democratic State, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 587 (1952).
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law, is the proposition that each seller's prices should be uniform,
with variances reflecting the performance of noncustomary marketing
services.4 The Robinson-Patman Act 5 can be said to represent an
attempt to legislate that principle into economic behavior. In fact,
however, by subtly equating injury to individual competitors to
injury to "competition," 6 the act is antithetical to the fundamental
philosophy of the antitrust laws that price competition in the market
shall be preserved. The act seeks to preserve competitors in the market
from the hazards of price competition, rather than the competitive
market system itself. Instead of harmonizing the demands of con-
flicting social groups in a manner serving the public interest, instead
of finding a balance between the interests of sellers and consumers,
the Robinson-Patman Act serves the limited interest of a single group
of sellers.
By shifting the judicial spotlight from the protection of competition
to the protection of competitors, the Robinson-Patman Act enor-
mously expanded the area of judicial control of economic behavior.
In so doing, it struck at the very vigor of the competitive process
itself. Each seller could thereafter no longer throw himself into the
hurly-burly of the market and vigorously seek to capture as much
of that market as possible by price competition. The moment a non-
uniform price reduction had the possibility of injuring individual
competitors, 7 at that moment must he stop and seek justification under
the act for his action.
The essentially anticompetitive philosophy of the Robinson-Patman
Act was a product of the drive to reach economic security through law
which emerged in the depression. Pressures of traditionally anti-
competitive groups,8 bringing to bear in their support the findings of
the Chain Store Investigation, 9 were successful in procuring the
enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act. The act is formally couched,
however, in terms indicative of the laudatory purpose to supplement
Sherman Act policy by prohibiting discriminations the effect of which
"may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly ... or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition." To the
extent the act prohibits predatory or systematic price discrimination,
it is in harmony with the stated purpose and other antitrust objec-
4. CARLSTON, LAW AND STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL ACTION 214 (1956).
5. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
6. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1948).
7. Ibid.
8. See Evans, Anti-Price Discrimination Act of 1936, 23 VA. L. Rsv. 140
(1936). It cannot be said that these groups had or have specific intent to
injure the American ideal of vigorous competition, at least insofar as it is
applied to others. See Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust
Laws, 61 HAiv. L. REv. 1289, 1334 (1948).
9. FTC, FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN STORE INVESTIGATION (1934).
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tives.10 To the extent, however, it prevents or suppresses price com-
petition on any level or between levels of the market structure, it is
anticompetitive and reflects the retrogressive group demands of par-
ticular individuals or institutions.
We have pointed out that the dominant philosophy of the act is in
essence the proposition that protection of competitors is identical to
the protection or promotion of competition." Certainly the protection
or guarantee of economic security to all businessmen can be recog-
nized as one of the group demands impinging on the legislative proc-
ess.12 The degree to which such a particularistic demand should be
granted in shaping the conditions of the market is a legislative
problem of the greatest magnitude.13
We are here concerned with one facet, and a central facet, of that
problem. We have before us the problem of a price reduction made
to meet competition and whether price competition of such a nature
shall be permitted under the act.
Price competition for the custom of buyers inherently tends to break
down price uniformity; hence both statute and decision recognized that
striving to retain a customer as against a lower bidder for his custom
would justify price reduction, at least to the extent of eliminating the
factor of price as an element of buyer preference. In that manner, a
basis for reconciliation between the conflicting group interests was
found and room provided for the competitive drive to express itself
in a manner consistent with the norm of uniform price.' 4 Statutory
recognition of this right to meet competition is contained in section
2 (b)15 of the Robinson-Patman Act:
10. It should be noted, however, that price discrimination of this nature is
also prohibited by the Sherman Act and by § 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1952). Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th
Cir. 1944). See also EDWARDS, MI&INTAINING COMPETITION 106 (1949).
11. "This dislike of having the security of any businessman impaired by
competition is characteristic of present day thinking in Britain. The British,
however, recognize that this is a denial of the competitive ideal, whereas we
seem to be giving effect to the same philosophy under the pretense that it
is a means of preserving competition." Gnirr, AN EcoNormc APPROACH TO
ANTITRUST PROBLEMs 34 (1951).
12. "In any competitive economy we- cannot avoid injury to some of the
competitors. The law does not, and under the free enterprise system it cannot,
guarantee businessmen against loss. That businessmen lose money or even
go bankrupt does not necessarily mean that competition has been injured....
We cannot guarantee competition against all injury. This can only be accom-
plished by prohibiting competition." H.R. REP. No. 1422, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
5, 6 (1949).
13. "Most Americans have long recognized that opportunity for market
access and fostering of market rivalry are basic tenets of our faith in competi-
tion as a form of economic organization." REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
NATIONAL COMMXITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 1 (1955).
14. See note 6 supra.
15. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1952).
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Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section,
that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities
furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by
showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of
this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the
Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination:
Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller
rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price
or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers
was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or
the services or facilities furnished by a competitor.
Senate Bill No. 11 now faces us with the question whether our
present system of antitrust laws shall be changed to the end that
price competition shall be completely subordinated to price uniformity
and price flexibility shall be superseded by price rigidity. It presents
the question whether price raiders of a businessman's customers can
be met with their own weapons and whether, in such circumstances,
retaliation must take the form of universal price reductions or whether
retaliation may instead be selective and limited to the area of struggle
for the single trader's custom. Ultimately, it raises the question
whether the law will permit a price structure to be subjected to the
erosive impact of individual price reductions to retain individual cus-
tomers, resulting at times in the gradual crumbling and eventual
collapse of prices and the establishment of a new and lower price
level generally, or whether the temptation to cut price shall be closed
by law to a competitor, except insofar as market pressures generally
may have built up to a point calling for a general and overall price
reduction.
Senate Bill No. 11 presents these questions because it proposes to
eliminate or to so restrict the "meeting competition" defense as to
render it virtually unattainable. The manner in which this is to be
accomplished is devious and marvellously dextrous:
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That unless the evidence affirmatively shows
that the effect of the discrimination may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, in any
section of the country, it shall be a complete defense for a seller to show
that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any
purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally
low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a
competitor: PROVIDED FURTHER, That nothing contained herein shall
be construed to alter the law applicable to the absorption of freight or
of shipping charges.
We shall analyze the effect of the proposed amendment in the next
section of this paper.
The bill represents the most recent manifestation of continuous
pressure to eliminate the "meeting competition" defense by adminis-
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trative, judicial, or legislative action. As introduced, both the original
Robinson bill and the original Patman bill omitted the broad absolute
defense contained in the original Clayton Act.16 The legislative process
of' amendment and conference eventually brought forth the defense
now contained in section 2 (b) as a limited preservation of the com-
petitive system in the interests of sellers who wished to compete and
buyers who desired the benefits of competition.'7
Senate Bill No. 11 and its counterparts appear to be a product of
the failure of the attack on the "meeting competition" defense in
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC.8 Following a long history of administrative
and judicial proceedings, the Supreme Court held the defense to be
absolute, rather than a mere procedural device in shifting the burden
of proof. Since Senate Bill No. 11 is aimed at the nullification of this
decision, the basic facts of the case bear restatement. 19
In the Detroit area Standard had 358 dealer customers to which it
sold gasoline at a uniform dealer or tankwagon price. Four of these
customers eventually acquired jobber facilities-bulk plants and
tank trucks-and took deliveries of gasoline in wholesale quantities.
After repeated demands or ultimatums from these customers and
after much bargaining and haggling, Standard granted reductions in
price of one and one-half cents per gallon from the prevailing dealer
price. These reductions were granted individually and over a period
of yearsi extending from the reduction to the first customer in 1929 to
the last reduction in 1938. It was undisputed that these reductions
were granted reluctantly to retain these customers and only ap-
proached or matched "an equally low price offered by a competitor"
on branded gasolines of comparable grade and quality.2°
The Commission seized upon the "prima facie" language, preceding
the proviso of section 2 (b), and interpreted the statute so as to make
the meeting of competition defense ineffective where there might be
an injury to competition (i.e., competitors) or where there might be
one of the other market effects proscribed by section 2 (a). ' Since
section 2 (a) had already provided that no violation occurred unless
there was a finding that the particular discrimination might tend to
have one of the prohibited market effects, the Commission's approach
neatly relegated the defense to a futile procedure. Under Senate Bill
No. 11 the defense would not lie when there was otherwise a possible
16. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1952).
17. Compare the majority and minority opinions in Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 247 n.14, 256 (1951).
18. 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
19. For a thorough economic analysis and a detailed investigation of the
facts surrounding this proceeding see McGee, Price Discrimination and Com-
petitive Effects: The Standard Oil of Indiana Case, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 398
(1956).
20. 340 U.S. at 234.
21. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. 13(a) (1952).
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violation of section 2 (a) arising from a price discrimination lessening
competition.
In reading the two subsections together, however, a majority of the
Supreme Court rejected the Commission's construction and found the
defense to be absolute within the narrow confines of its limitations.2 2
The Court recognized that under the Commission's interpretation the
defense "would have such little, if any, applicability as to be practi-
cally meaningless." In commenting on the element of injury the Court
observed:
It must have been obvious to Congress that any price reduction to any
dealer may always affect competition at the dealer's level as well as at
the dealer's resale level, whether or not the reduction to the dealer is
discriminatory.2 3 (Emphasis added).
Faced with conflicting economic philosophies, the Court stated:
We need not now reconcile, in its entirety, the economic theory which
underlies the Robinson-Patman Act with that of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts. It is enough to say that Congress did not seek by the Robinson-
Patman Act either to abolish competition or so radically to curtail it
that a seller would have no substantial right of self-defense against a
price raid by a competitor.... There is nothing to show a congressional
purpose.... to compel the seller to choose only between ruinously cutting
its prices to all its customers to match the price offered to one, or refusing
to meet the competition and then ruinously raising its prices to its remain-
ing customers to cover increased costs.24
To this date the proceeding has not yet been finally resolved and is
now again pending before the Supreme Court.25 The case was re-
manded by the Supreme Court for a specific finding of fact on the
question of "good faith." In spite of the fact that the original trial
examiner found the necessary facts to establish "good faith," the
Commission has refused to make such a finding and is now trying to
bring it within the pricing system interdicted under the Staley case.2
In the Staley case, the Commission used the Robinson-Patman Act to
invalidate a rigid and fictitious basing point pricing system invulner-
able under the Sherman Act and to legislate an alternative "mill net"
pricing system. Although the system invalidated in Staley artificially
raised prices and restricted competition, the Staley doctrine is now
resorted to as a means of denying sellers a competitive practice which
22. It should be noted that the minority agreed with the majority that the
effect of the Commission's construction was "to weaken competition in that
a seller, while otherwise maintaining his prices, cannot meet his antagonist's
price to get a single order or customer ... ." but dissented on the basis of
Congressional intent. 340 U.S. at 253-54.
23. Id. at 250.
24. Id. at 249-50.
25. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 352 U.S.
950 (1956).
26. FTC v. Staley Mg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
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would tend to undermine the price level and to promote innovation
and flexibility in the market structure.
LIITED SURVIVAL OF THE DEFENSE?
Price discriminations prohibited by section 2 (a) of the Robinson-
Patman Act are those where the effect of the discriminations may be
(1) "substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly,"
or (2) "to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefits of such discrimination,
or with customers of either of them." Proponents of Senate Bill No. 11
contend that the bill would bar tlge meeting competition defense only
where the ftrst of these effects is present and would, therefore, not
entirely eliminate the defense. This faces the businessman with the
difficult task of deciding when the meeting of competition defense is
available, in reacting to a competitor's equally low price. He must
decide whether the effect of a retaliatory price reduction might be
to lessen "competition," and would therefore be unlawful, or whether
it might be merely to injure or destroy "competition," and would
therefore be lawful.
In maintaining that the meeting of competition still remains a
complete defense under certain conditions, advocates of the bill trace
delicate distinctions between the two types of effects. Such distinc-
tions are not apparent upon a reading of the statute and are, at best,
somewhat elusive. The American businessman is given credit for a
great deal of finesse in the intricacies of a field in which experts usually
disagree, altlough his morality in defending himself against economic
attack is sharply questioned.27 Certainly we can hardly ask him to
have a lawyer at his elbow for consultation on every price reduction
of this nature-a consulation which might in judicial retrospect later
prove to be futile. Except for one very recent case at the district court
level,28 the courts have assumed that "substantial lessening of compe-
tition" and "injury to competition" are synonymous, and some cases
appear to imply the identity in character of the two concepts.P
Supposedly, the latter effect is to be applicable to individual competi-
tors, while the former effect is to apply to the vigor of competition
generally.30 The lack of judicial distinction of such a nature, however,
is further aggravated by the all-too-frequent application of a rule of
automatic illegality, where violations have been found to be caused
27. S. REP. No. 2817, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1956).
28. Alexander v. Texas Co., 149 F. Supp. 37 (W.D. La. 1957).
29. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948); Corn Products Refining Co.
v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945), affirming 144 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1944); Standard
Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'd. on other grounds, 340 U.S.
231 (1951).
30. H.R. REP. No. 2202, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1955), reporting on a com-
panion bill H.R. 1840.
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by acts having an infinitesimal impact upon either the vigor of com-
petition generally or upon individual competitors. In the Morton Salt
case,3oa the prohibited market effect was found to exist where one-
tenth of one per cent of Morton's customers failed to receive a minute
quantity discount of ten cents per case on salt sold in carload quanti-
ties. Either the de minimis rule was erroneously translated to mean
"the law exaggerates trifles" or the degree of market effect was con-
sidered immaterial.
The extent to which the Commission recognizes any distinction in
degree is shown by the Minneapolis-Honeywell case,31 where the
Commission ruled that "to the extent that business is held or diverted"
by a price differential "competition has been adversely affected within
the meaning of the law." Obviously, any sale holds or diverts business.
The complexities of a market or economic analysis of the problem
were also avoided in the recent Moog Industries case,3 2 where the
question of competitive injury was found to be a mere matter of
"simple mathematics."
An attempt to minimize the tendency toward automatic or per se
market effect in the language of Senate Bill No. 11 was made by way
of amendment by Senator Wiley, when the bill was reported without
recommendation from the Antitrust Subcommittee to the full Judici-
ary Committee. The bill now requires that the evidence affirmatively
show the prohibited market effect. This language does not appear in
section 2 (a) itself, although it is fairly to be implied therein. Whether
the underscoring of this truism in the bill will cause any substantial
difference in the application of the statute is at least doubtful.
The fact remains that through the subterfuge of artful artlessness
in draftsmanship, Senate Bill No. 11 will effect a practical repeal of
the meeting competition defense. The legislative process would then
achieve through indirection that which would most probably fail if
approached frankly and directly. This is not the first time the tech-
nique has been used.
NECESSITY
By pointing in alarm to the Supreme Court's decision in the
Standard Oil case, those groups opposed to competitive pricing have
used the case as a focal point in their demand for corrective legislation
to restore the "original" vitality of the act. Yet the Standard Oil case
30a. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
31. FTC v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, 397 (1948),
rev'd, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
32. Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. granted,
353 U.S. 908 (1957). With respect to testimony by customers to the effect
that they had not been injured the Court stated: "A witness cannot be al-
lowed by conclusion to deny a mathematical fact." Moog Industries, Inc. v.
FTC, supra, 238 F.2d at 51.
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was no sudden and unexpected change in existing law.34 As the
Supreme Court stated:
[T]here has been widespread understanding that, under the Robinson-
Patman Act, it is a complete defense to a charge of price discrimination
for a seller to show that its price differential has been made in good faith
to meet a lawful and equally low price of a competitor.3 4
The Court then went on to document its statement by citation of
actions by the FTC in Commission proceedings and by statements
made by or on behalf of the Commission, Commission Counsel, and
the Department of Justice.35 Of particular note is the statement filed
by the Assistant Chief Counsel of the Commission with the Temporary
National Economic Committee:
The amended Act now safeguards the right of a seller to discriminate in
price in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, but he
has the burden of proof on that question. This right is guaranteed by
statute and could not be curtailed by any mandate on order of the
Commission.... The right of self defense against competitive price attacks
is as vital in a competitive economy as the right of self defense against
personal attack.36
The Department of Justice 37 and the Department of Commerce,8
both of which are vitally concerned with safeguarding our competitive
system through our antitrust laws, have consistently opposed Senate
Bill No. 11 and its predecessors. The White House, under both a
Democratic and a Republican administration, has approved legislation
contrary to the purposes of Senate Bill No. 11. 39 Even the Federal
Trade Commission has at times opposed Senate Bill No. 11 and similar
bills, and its current approval of the bill was reached only by a vote of
three to two.4 0 Its change in position may have been caused by the
decision of the Ninth Circuit in the Balian Ice Cream Co. case,4 1 but
the rationale of that decision was lack of competitive injury, although
the court spoke freely of the meeting competition defense.
Whence, then, the necessity for the legislation? Is it that the defense
33. But see Senator Kefauver's remarks in Hearings on S. 11 Before the
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 212 (1956).
34. 340 U.S. at 246.
35. Id. at 246 n.12, 247 n.13.
36. THE BAsnJG POINT PROBLEM 139 (TNEC Monograph 42, 1941).
37. Hearings on S. 11 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 688 (1956)
(hereinafter referred to as 1956 Hearings); 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 826 (1957)
(hereinafter referred to as 1957 Hearings).
38. 1956 Hearings supra note 37, at 344; 1957 Hearings supra note 37,
at 669.
39. 1956 Hearings, supra note 37, at 165.
40. Statement of William C. Kern, Member of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 1957 Hearings, supra note 37, at 641.
41. Balian Ice Cream Co., Inc. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir.
1955).
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has been abused by sellers in successfully circumventing the issuance
of cease and desist orders for violations of section 2 (a) ? Such a sur-
mise does not accord with the facts. Since the enactment of the
Robinson-Patman Act in 1936, the Federal Trade Commission has not
upheld the meeting competition defense in a single recorded case. Even
after the Commission was reversed in the Standard Oil case, it has,
as yet, refused to sustain the defense.
If this be so, what is the source of the pressure for the legislation?
It comes from groups which historically have sought shelter from
price competition, such as associations of retail druggists, retail
grocers, food brokers, etc. These are the groups which supported
other anticompetitive legislation favoring horizontal price fixing,
such as the McGuire Act,42 the Miller-Tydings Act43 and the so-called
state "fair trade" laws, and state sales below cost statutes. The bill
may be knowh by the company it keeps.
There are many yardsticks to test the sincerity of a professed admiration
for the antitrust laws-and no one publicly admits being opposed to our
antitrust laws-but certainly the acid test of such sincerity is unequivocal
opposition to price fixing agreements in any form.4
Seemingly, the proponents of Senate Bill No. 11 look upon the
defense of meeting competition as some monstrous loophole, which is
used to subvert the object of the Robinson-Patman Act.45 Not only
does past experience fail to bear this out but the defense is so expressly
and impliedly qualified as to make it an extremely limited one. Con-
stantly overlooked in speculating hypothetical abuses of the defense
is the requirement of "good faith," the meaning of which has now
been fairly well developed by the courts. Other limitations of the
defense include the following conditions: It is available only in indi-
vidual competitive situations; 46 the competitor's price must be a
lawful price or reasonably believed to be lawful;47 a competitor's price
can be met but not undercut;48 the defense is not available where the
intent is predatory;49 there is a possible requirement that the defense
can only be used to retain an existing customer; 0 the defense is
42. 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
43. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
44. Statement of William Simon, 1956 Hearings, supra note 37, at 165.
45. That the object of the act is not entirely free of serious question, see
Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at
Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929 (1951).
46. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
47. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1955). See also REPORT or THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COmmITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 181
(1955). The question of lawfulness is in fact an aspect of the element of
"good faith."
48. Id. at 182.
49. Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
50. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1955). But see REPORT, op. cit.
note 47, at 184.
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affirmative, i.e., the burden of proof is on the defendant;5' and there
is some authority denying a seller the right to help his customer meet
competition.52
PROSPECTIVE EFFECT
The Senate Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1153 in the 84th
Congress sets forth arguments for and against price discrimination,
thereby reopening an issue which was closed by the enactment of the
Robinson-Patman Act in 1936. Although this basic issue is indeed still
open to serious question,54 by centering its attention on the broad
issue the Report avoids the much narrower issue presented by Senate
Bill No. 11. To the extent that the defense of meeting competition
permits price discrimination, however, the arguments relating to this
practice are pertinent.
In setting forth the economic arguments against price discrimination,
the Report labors the obvious and repeats that which was long ago
conceded by reciting the manner in which the practice of price dis-
crimination may be abused.55 The enactment of section 2 (a) settled
this question over two decades ago. The discussion overlooks the fact
that section 2 (b) is not an offensive weapon of large corporations,
but is rather virtually an automatic reaction of a competitor, used by
either the large or the small, in defense of the economic life of the
user.
The sole argument advanced by the Report in favor of price dis-
crimination consists of a rather desultory account of the erosive effect
of price discrimination upon established prices. The concept is said
to be of little weight because it rests upon "pure theory and specula-
tion."56
The erosion theory begins with fact; it accepts as a starting point
what now exists-imperfect competition. Many markets are oligopolis-
51. Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
52. Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co., 136 F. Supp. 420 (D. Conn.
1955), rev'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 965 (1957).
53. S. REP. No. 2817, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1956).
54. Austern, Inconsistencies in the Law, in ANTITRUST LAW Symposrm 158
(CCH 1951); Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61
HARv. L. REv. 1289 (1948); Berger and Goldstein, Meeting Competition under
the Robinson-Patman Act, 44 Iim. L. REv. 315 (1949); Burns, The Antitrust
Laws and the Regulation of Price Competition, 4 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 301
(1937); McAllister, Price Control by Law in the United States, 4 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 273 (1937); McNair, Marketing Functions and Costs and the
Robinson-Patman Act, 4 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 334 (1937); Rowe, Price
Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion. Another Look at Robinson-Pat-
man, 60 YALE L. J. 929 (1951).
55. The REPORT, op. cit. supra note 47, also mentions that supporting argu-
ments are moral and sociological. See note 2 supra. No doubt discerning
readers may also detect aspects of loyalty, patriotism and motherhood. In
order that there may be "equality of opportunity" in discussion, it may
charitably be said that both sides are in favor of good and against evil.
56. S. REP. No. 2817, supra note 53, at 16.
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tic in nature, that is to say, have a limited number of sellers. Such a
situation creates an attitude of "rival consciousness" or mutual watch-
fulness among competitors. The group interest of competitors, that
of a united front on price, wars with an individual seller's self-interest.
An individual seller can increase his own profits by utilizing excess
capacity and selling increased output at a discriminatory price above
his incremental cost. Whether a particular seller will choose to dis-
criminate will depend upon his estimate of a variety of considera-
tions, 57 the most important of which is the delay of retaliation from
his competitors through secrecy. But such discrimination cannot go
undetected indefinitely; the mere diversion of business gives rise to
suspicion. Successful bargainers use their success with one seller as
a bargaining pressure against other sellers. Other sellers gradually
retaliate by similar concessions. Eventually the whole price structure
becomes spotty and is gradually dropped to a lower level. Sticky
prices and rigid price systems are thus undermined or eroded, forcing
increased competition for business at lower prices.58
This is not to say that the sole and invariable effect of price dis-
crimination is a tendency to eat away at rigid or uniform prices. As
is the case with any other business practice, the effect of price dis-
crimination is dependent upon its economic or market context. But the
fact that price discrimination is capable of abuse in certain market
contexts, in ways which are in fact covered by existing law, does not
detract from the validity of the erosion theory in other market
contexts.
The principal criticism of the theory before the Senate Antitrust
Subcommittee consisted in the testimony of Dr. John M. Blair, chief
economist for the subcommittee.59 In citing the work of Dirlam and
Kahn60 in their analysis of the A. & P. case,61 Dr. Blair chose a market
context with an adjudged violation of the Sherman Act, in which a
large buyer possessed sufficient market power to prevent sellers from
extending to others the granted price concessions. Such an extreme
cannot be said to be prevalent. The point urged by Dr. Blair is to the
effect that large buyers, who have the greatest leverage in forcing
price concessions, tend to by-pass large sellers and seek out small
sellers, while, on the other hand, large sellers tend to seek out small
buyers. But the interplay of market forces cannot thereby be com-
57. See McGee, supra note 19, at 400-04, for a more detailed explanation.
58. "Sporadic, unsystematic discrimination is one of the most powerful
forces of competition in modem industrial markets. Like a high wind, it
seizes on small openings and crevices in an 'orderly' price structure and tears
it apart." Adelman, supra note 54, at 1331.
59. 1957 Hearings, supra note 37, at 1176-83.
60. Dirlam and Kahn, Antitrust Law and the Big Buyer: Another Look at
the A. & P. Case, 60 J. POL. EcoN. 129 (1952).
61. United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F.2d
79 (7th Cir. 1949).
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pletely eliminated and price erosion still takes place, though its force
may be somewhat lessened. Moreover, if such a tendency does in fact
exist, it can only be accelerated by Senate Bill No. 11. If large buyers
are foreclosed from all possibility of obtaining a price concession,
their purchasing power may be directed toward output contracts
with small sellers, resulting in the estrangement of such sellers from
alternative market outlets.62 After estrangement, forced lower prices
on an output basis avoid the question of price discrimination, since
the seller has only one buyer.
The denial to buyers, through enforced uniform prices, of any
effective possibility of success in bargaining for price reductions, can
only tend to price rigidity, with a consequent adverse effect upon
competition. The pressure of price competition tends to push prices
downward to a uniform price level. The process is not reversible.
Enforced uniformity tends toward the maintenance of higher prices
at a level that is artificial in relation to demand and capacity. Sellers
are foreclosed from probing demand at lower price levels through
discriminatory prices and, consequently, "hesitate to make downward
price changes for fear of 'spoiling the market' in case demand proves
to be inelastic. '63 Greater output with its attendant benefits, such as
fuller employment, is thereby restrained.
In defense of Senate Bill No. 11, Dr. Blair has asserted that price
concessions by small sellers are discouraged by large sellers meeting
their competition,64 thereby lessening the erosion and tending toward
price rigidity. Economist John S. McGee has a different view of the
competitive practices of small firms:
Contrary to many assertions, smaller firms can successfully intrude upon
their larger rival's province by cutting prices. By nibbling away at their
rival's business through secret, discriminatory price cuts, smaller firms
may (1) escape the detection of their rivals over longer periods, and (2)
make their rivals unsure of the magnitude of price changes even when
the fact of price changes is well known. Furthermore, small firms may
have the important advantages of flexibility, simplicity of organization,
and an appropriate irreverence for the existing price level. 65
Enforced price uniformity may also have the effect of causing
sellers to divert their drive for business into advertising to create
demand for their particular product. This causes buyers to differen-
tiate the product from substantially similar products with a resulting
lessening of competition. Or in a market where sellers are collusively
inclined, uniform price policies supported by law are more easily
maintained.
66
62. Note, 58 YALE L. J. 1161 (1949).
63. McNair, supra note 54, at 337.
64. 1957 Hearings, supra note 37, at 1182.
69. 1956 Hearings, supra note 37, at 580.
66. Adelman, supra note 54, at 1329.
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The maintenance of dynamic competition 1 demands freedom and
flexibility of the marketing structure, but the advocates of single
price policies take a static view of the market structure. Manufac-
turers, wholesalers, and retailers are pigeonholed and their functions
classified and allocated. Shifting and realignment of functions be-
tween levels of distribution are looked upon as disturbing.68 Such
an attitude impedes progress and reduces competition. Yet the pro-
hibition of price differentials has an anticompetitive effect, since func-
tional discounts run afoul of such statutory prohibitions wherever
there is a shift or realignment of functions in the market structure.
Supporters of Senate Bill No. 11 are concerned about the position
of jobbers and retailers who do not operate in accordance with their
concept of the classical mode of operation. They take a purely institu-
tional view of the marketing process, with each level of distribution
having vested rights in the performance of particular functions. This
is certainly one of the problems presented by the Standard Oil case,
and the effect of Senate Bill No. 11 on this problem is pointed up by
the following exchange between Senator Kefauver and one of the
jobbers involved in that case:
Mr. Citrin: . . .I merely wanted to point out how the effects of this
particular case, of this particular bill could hurt me as a jobber and how
it could hurt all the other jobbers.
Senator Kefauver: You are the one that the bill is supposed to hurt be-
cause it is supposed to try to prevent you from -retailing as a jobber.69
(Emphasis added.)
If this be true, one of the purposes of Senate Bill No. 11 is to inhibit
the shifting of market functions and thereby to increase the stagnation
of market structures. Antiquated systems of distribution will be
further insulated against the competition of modern methods which
result in lower prices to consumers. In other market situations, how-
ever, where middlemen by their usefulness can withstand the rigors
of competition, Senate Bill No. 11 may cause their premature and
unfortunate demise. Many sellers seek alternative channels of distri-
bution to minimize risk and in so doing are said to "straddle the
market."70 Under Senate Bill No. 11, selling to both wholesalers and
retailers, as in the Standard Oil case, may be extremely dangerous
for a seller, unless he can police the wholesaler in violation of the
Sherman Act. Sellers may therefore elect to assume entirely the
67. See RODGERS, DYNAMIc ComPETITION, INSTITUTE ON ANTITRUST LAWS
AND PRICE REGULATION, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION (1950).
68. "[U]nfortunately, the pseudo-simplicity of this A B C marketing struc-
ture seems to have commended it, in the minds of many people, as the suitable
and appropriate arrangement, any deviations from which are to be discour-
aged." McNair, supra note 54, at 339.
69. 1956 Hearings, supra note 37, at 404.
70. McNair, supra note 54, at 345.
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wholesale function, thereby squeezing out competing wholesale dis-
tributors.
The economic advantages and increased competition resulting from
the widespread practice of cross-hauling have been conceded by most
parties on each side of the Senate Bill No. 11 debate. Through this
practice manufacturers with excess capacity reach out into other areas
to compete with other manufacturers having a freight advantage. This
is commonly carried out by absorbing freight in order to deliver at a
competitive price. When Senate Bill No. 11 was introduced in the
current Congress, it had appended the following additional proviso:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That nothing contained herein shall be construed
to alter the law applicable to the absorption of freight or of shipping
charges.
But the legality of the practice of individual freight absorption in
most cases rests upon the availability of the "meeting competition"
defense. In this connection, a former Chairman of the Federal Trade
-Commission, Edward F. Howrey had this to say:
But, one must ask, how can such language be added to a bill designed to
eliminate from the statute the very provision upon which validity of
freight absorption has always depended? To say that you cannot lower
your price to meet competition, but can absorb freight, may be a neat use
of the English language, but it is, of course, a complete paradox and from
the standpoint of statutory interpretation may well prove to be a non-
sequitur.71
Senate Bill No. 11 is concerned with a day-to-day problem presented
to every businessman upon which he must make rapid decisions in
a more or less routine fashion without benefit of counsel. The pro-
visions, prohibitions and effects of the bill are so uncertain as to leave
businessmen and lawyers, alike, in a sea of confusion in meeting this
problem.7 2 As Congressman Patman admitted: "It raises questions
all right, but that is what makes lawsuits."73
CONCLUSION
Admittedly, vigorous competition is a heavy burden upon the par-
ticipants. There will probably always be those who fear and are
reluctant to assume that burden. As a group they can and do exert
strong anticompetitive pressure. Senate Bill No. 11 is a manifestation
of this pressure, but it is professed to be within the opposing goal of
71. REMARxS OF EDWARD F. HowREY BEFORE THE SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW
OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 15, January 23, 1957.
72. This confusion is aptly brought out by a hilarious account of a hypo-
thetical but typical conversation between a businessman and his salesman
after an assumed enactment of Senate Bill No. 11. 1956 Hearings, supra note
37, at 282.
73. Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary
Committee on H.R. 11, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1956).
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fostering competition, in order to make it politically palatable. By
purporting to allow the defense of meeting competition, unless the
effect of such action may tend to lessen "competition," the ostensible
object of the bill is misleading. It effectively repeals the defense and
lessens competition in so doing. The storm shelter afforded individual
competitors by the Robinson-Patman Act is now to be made even more
invulnerable. Former Chairman Howrey of the Federal Trade Com-
mission has aptly called this approach "the most outrageous sort of
legislative sophistry."74
There is no valid antitrust or competitive purpose compelling the
enactment of Senate Bill No. 11. The group interest of its supporters
is not sufficient to prevail over the interests of all other sectors of the
economy. Antithetical to the desired and normal reactions of a seller
faced with price competition-"S. 11 will succeed, I am afraid, in
making a law violator of almost everyone who is in the business of
buying and selling goods."75
74. How=EY, supra note 71, at 17.
75. Id. at 10.
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